Sick leave: the government plans to extend the waiting period, increasing the non-compensated days from 3 to 6.

In the current context of controlling public spending, the French government is considering a significant measure aimed at modifying the terms of sick leave compensation. The project, widely debated in 2025, proposes to extend the waiting period, doubling the number of non-compensated days from 3 to 6 days. This proposal reflects a clear intention to reduce the financial burden caused by sick leave, estimated at several billion euros annually. However, it has met strong opposition from economic and social actors, notably employer representatives and unions, who denounce it as a measure that penalizes employees and is counterproductive for public health management. Parallel to this, insurance companies such as MGEN, Allianz, AXA, and mutual organizations such as Mutuelles de France, AG2R La Mondiale, or Harmonie Mutuelle are closely monitoring legislative developments, aware of the potential impacts on their offerings and risk management related to employee health. This proposal also takes place in a context where discussions on workplace absenteeism and corporate responsibility in managing sick leave remain at the forefront of current events, as highlighted by recent media coverage on platforms such as TF1 or RMC. This complex dossier invites a thorough reflection on indemnification mechanisms, economic issues, and the social realities associated with sick leave in France.

The current modalities of the waiting period for sick leave in France

In 2025, the sick leave compensation system is based on a waiting period that determines the delay before the employee receives daily allowances paid by Social Security. Currently, this period is set at three days, during which employees receive no financial compensation in case of sick leave. This mechanism aims to limit short-term absences and control costs borne by the general Social Security system, which finances a large part of health-related benefits. It should be noted that this waiting period applies to both private sector employees and certain public service agents, although rules may vary.

During this waiting period, it is generally the employer who covers the employee’s absence, even if there is no legal obligation for them to do so, except in certain collective agreements or company agreements that provide for salary continuation. These are situations where employees often find themselves without immediate resources, which can lead to financial difficulties, especially for vulnerable or modest-income workers.

In practice, this waiting period helps regulate the use of short-term sick leaves, encouraging some employees to limit their absence, sometimes at the expense of their actual health. Studies listed by the PasseportSanté website have highlighted a phenomenon where the waiting period can play a role in individual management of health issues, with varying consequences depending on sectors and working conditions.

• ⏳ 3 days of waiting without indemnification by Social Security
• 👷‍♂️ Limited support from employers during these days
• 💼 Impact on vulnerable and low-income employees
• ⚖️ Goal of regulating short-term sick leaves
• 🔎 Variability depending on public or private sector

Criteria	Situation before the project	Examples
Number of waiting days	3 days	Start of indemnity on the 4th day of absence
Employer coverage	Variable, depending on collective agreements	FNAC, MGEN according to internal agreements
Impact on employees	Financial difficulties in the first 3 days	Health of vulnerable employees

Why does the 2025 government plan to extend the waiting days to 6 days?

In a move driven by a desire to control public expenditure, the French executive has targeted the financial support for sick leave as a major lever. Social Security is expected to bear an annual cost estimated at 12 billion euros related to these benefits, a significant issue given ongoing budget tensions. Extending the waiting period from three to six days aims to reduce these direct costs by shifting the financial burden onto companies and their insurance partners during the non-compensated absence period.

According to a report disclosed by Le Figaro, this measure is part of a broader strategy to combat workplace absenteeism, a sector where France shows indicators above the European average. By asking private actors, such as Allianz, AXA, Groupama, or MAAF, to intervene between the 4th and the 6th day of absence, the State hopes to ease the burden on Social Security and encourage corporate responsibility regarding human resource management and prevention.

This transfer of costs will require significant adaptation of collective insurance systems, notably among mutual organizations such as Harmonie Mutuelle or AG2R La Mondiale, which will need to adjust their guarantees. Insurance companies will also need to redefine their pricing models to incorporate this additional coverage factor. Such a transformation could lead to increased contributions for companies, a point of particular concern in recent debates.

• 📉 Reduce overall sick leave costs
• 🏢 Shift part of the costs to employers and insurers
• 📈 Fight against excessive workplace absenteeism
• 💡 Encourage prevention and absence management
• ⚖️ Rebalance responsibilities between public and private actors

Parameter	Current situation	Projected situation
Number of waiting days	3 days	6 days
Financial intervention	Social Security from the 4th day	Employers and insurers between the 4th and 6th day
Budgetary goal	Maintain expenses at current level	Reduce costs related to sick leave

Reactions of unions and employers to the extension of the waiting period

The proposal to extend the waiting period has sparked strong criticism among social actors, illustrating deep disagreements over the distribution of costs and employees’ realities. Marylise Léon, head of CFDT, criticized on RMC a project she describes as “deeply unfair.” According to her, this change would merely shift the costs of Health Insurance onto companies between the 4th and 7th days, while imposing an additional burden on employees.

She also warned about the risk of establishing a “public order waiting day” that would not be compensated by either Social Security or employers. This scenario could worsen employees’ job insecurity during illness. Furthermore, Marylise Léon recalls that “being ill is not a choice,” and that these measures could encourage delaying the decision to report an absence, disregarding health conditions.

From the employer side, Éric Chevée, vice-president of CPME, expresses a different form of opposition. He emphasizes that this will ultimately incur “a final cost for the company” and notes the lack of means for business owners to monitor or reduce sick leave. He stresses the difficulty in taking decisive action on a problem whose causes they do not control, namely employee health, which falls more under health and social protection systems.

• ⚖️ Social and economic injustice for employees
• 🏢 Additional final costs for companies
• 🔍 Lack of real control over sick leave
• 🚑 Risk of worsening public health
• 🛑 Complexity and perverse effects on human resource management

Actors	Position	Arguments
CFDT (Marylise Léon)	Firm opposition	Injustice and cost shifting to employees and companies
CPME (Éric Chevée)	Pragmatic opposition	Additional costs without means for action
Various unions	Mobilization against the reform	Defense of employees’ rights

Potential economic and social consequences of extending the waiting days

Implementing this project to extend the waiting period would cause a significant change in the social and economic landscape. Economically, companies could see an increase in costs related to supplementary insurance policies purchased from insurers like MGEN, Allianz, or AXA to cover the non-compensated period by Social Security. This could lead to a review of rates and particularly penalize small and medium-sized enterprises, which are already vulnerable due to competitive pressures and uncertain economic environments.

Socially, this measure could lead to increased tensions within professional relationships. Employees whose health is not factored into budget calculations may perceive this reform as a stigmatization of their illness-related absence. In some cases, such pressure could prolong sick leave, due to a lack of appropriate early intervention, which unions strongly fear.

Furthermore, the partial transfer of financial burden onto employers could exacerbate inequalities between economic sectors, depending on whether companies are better or less equipped to manage these risks through their collective insurance or mutual arrangements. Groups such as Groupama or Harmonie Mutuelle would then be heavily solicited to adapt their services and coverage, increasing the market complexity of supplementary social protection.

• 💶 Increase in insurance costs for companies
• ⚠️ Increased financial and moral pressure on employees
• 📉 Risks of longer or pathological sick leaves increasing
• 🏭 Sectoral inequalities amplified
• 🔄 Significant adjustments in mutual and insurance sectors

Impact	Economic consequences	Social consequences
Insurance costs	Possible increase in premiums for companies	–
Employer-employee relations	More complex management of absences	Tensions and worker dissatisfaction
Compensation	Shift between actors in managing coverage	Health insecurity risk

Legal considerations related to extending the waiting days and their regulatory framework

The legal framework surrounding the reform of sick leave is particularly dense and the subject of debate. Extending the waiting period requires an evolution of the Social Security Code, as well as potentially impacted collective agreements. This change necessitates an in-depth analysis of employees’ rights, but also of employers’ obligations. The measures considered must be compatible with international conventions relating to labor law and social protection, notably those established by the International Labour Organization (ILO).

The risk of litigation cannot be ruled out, especially if employees believe their fundamental rights are being violated. Legal recourse could emerge before labor courts or in national and European courts, concerning notably equal treatment of employees, the principle of non-discrimination, and the right to social protection essential for health preservation.

In this context, some companies, especially large and medium-sized enterprises insured by AG2R La Mondiale or MAAF, seek to anticipate these changes by adapting their collective insurance contracts and informing their employees about the new conditions applicable. Vigilance is therefore necessary to ensure a compliant transition respecting regulatory requirements and social expectations.

• ⚖️ Regulatory evolution of the Social Security Code
• 📜 Compliance with conventions and collective agreements
• 👩‍⚖️ Risk of litigation and labor court appeals
• 🌍 Respect for international labour standards
• 📣 Involvement of insurers and mutual organizations in implementation

Legal aspects	Issues	Actions to be taken
Social Security Code	Mandatory update	Adaptation of regulatory texts
Collective agreements	Possible revision needed	Negotiation with social partners
Potential litigation	Disputes over employee rights	Preparation for legal proceedings

Implications for private insurers and mutual organizations regarding the delay in financing waiting days

Given this legislative development, insurance companies and mutual organizations are at the forefront of managing the financial and organizational impacts. Major players such as MGEN, Allianz, AXA, Mutuelles de France, or Harmonie Mutuelle will need to reconsider their supplementary health insurance offerings and collective guarantees to include the period of indemnification now between the 4th and 6th day of absence.

This postponement could lead to adjustments in contributions, which will weigh on employers, especially small structures and sectors already economically vulnerable. Furthermore, the nature of the guarantees offered may be revised to include broader coverage, similar to practices already in place for some actors like AG2R La Mondiale or MAAF.

This situation encourages a reinforced dialogue between insurers and client companies to define tailored solutions, balancing cost control and maintaining employee protection. Innovation in insurance contracts could thus be reflected in incentive measures for prevention, workplace health management, and even personalized support systems.

• 📈 Revision of contributions and collective guarantees
• 🤝 Increased negotiation with employers
• 🛡️ Incorporation of extended waiting days into coverage
• ⚙️ Development of health and workplace solutions
• 📞 Enhanced support and communication

Insurers / Mutuals	Financial impacts	Recommended actions
MGEN, Allianz	Increased budgets related to sick leave	Adjustment of collective contracts
AXA, Harmonie Mutuelle	Recalibration of contributions	Strengthening of health offerings
Mutuelles de France, AG2R La Mondiale	Negotiation with employers for coverage	Development of preventive measures

Effects on employees and individual strategies in response to the prolongation of waiting days

In this new environment, employees will need to anticipate longer periods without compensation in case of sick leave, which could have a deterrent or anxiety-inducing effect. This extension increases the financial vulnerability of many workers, especially those employed in sectors with high precarity or low wages.

Some individual strategies might emerge, ranging from limiting non-negotiable short leaves to seeking additional solutions through mutual organizations and personal insurance. Employees might also be compelled to resort more frequently to supplementary health coverage measures, which are not always accessible to everyone, notably in small companies with fewer collective agreements in place.

Finally, this measure risks impacting team morale and work dynamics, increasing perceived pressures and potentially leading to a deterioration of the social climate. Testimonials from employees in companies such as Fnac or Volkswagen illustrate these rising tensions.

• 💸 Increased risk of economic precarity
• 🛡️ Seeking supplementary coverage
• 😰 Stress and anxiety related to health and work
• ⌛ Limitation of short-term leaves
• 🤝 Negative impact on social climate

Consequences	Expected effects on employees	Concerned companies
Economic precarity	Longer loss of income	Fnac, Volkswagen
Use of supplementary insurance	Increased personal costs	Small businesses
Work-related stress	Deterioration of social climate	Groupama, MGEN

International comparison of waiting periods for sick leave

The length of the waiting period, or the delay before effective compensation for sick leave, varies significantly from country to country and often reflects national priorities regarding social policy and health management at work. In France, the proposal to increase this delay to six days positions the country at the upper end of the European range, or even beyond some practices observed elsewhere.

For example, in Germany, the waiting period is generally three days, similar to the current situation in France, with compensation usually provided by the employer during this period before switching to health insurance funds. In the UK, compensation begins as early as the first day, but under certain conditions, with a cap on the duration of benefits. In Italy, the delay is also three days, but with variable modalities depending on sectors.

This diversity illustrates cultural and economic differences but also strategies of states to reconcile social protection and cost management. In some Scandinavian countries, coverage can be immediate but is accompanied by close medical follow-up and strong prevention policies to prevent abuse.

• 🇩🇪 Germany: 3 days, employer covers
• 🇬🇧 United Kingdom: compensation from day 1, capped
• 🇮🇹 Italy: 3 days, variable depending on sectors
• 🇫🇷 France (project): 6 days before indemnification
• 🇸🇪 Sweden: immediate coverage with prevention

Countries	Waiting period	Indemnification modalities
France (2025 project)	6 days	Employers then Social Security from the 7th day
Germany	3 days	Employer indemnifies, then health insurance
United Kingdom	0 days	Indemnification from day 1, with conditions
Italy	3 days	Variable depending on sector, employer or insurance
Sweden	No waiting period	Immediate indemnification and health prevention

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions about extending waiting days for sick leave

• The waiting day refers to the non-compensated absence period at the start of a sick leave, during which the employee does not receive daily allowances.

• This measure aims to reduce Social Security expenses related to sick leave and to make employers more responsible in managing absences.

• Unions and employers’ organizations criticize the transfer of costs to companies and employees, deeming this measure unfair and unfeasible.

• Insurance companies and mutual organizations will need to adjust their guarantees and contributions to cover the extended period without Social Security indemnity.

• France ranks among countries with the longest waiting periods, with a delay longer than most neighboring countries, where the non-compensated periods are generally shorter.

For more detailed information, see particularly this comprehensive analysis or recent articles from the Franceinfo economy service. Specific insights are also available on this page dedicated to insurance and its challenges.

Source: www.laprovence.com